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Working Paper 4: 
Reinsertion Assistance and the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in War to 
Peace Transitions 
 
Alpaslan Özerdem and Sukanya Podder 
(with Sorcha O‘Callaghan and Sara Pantuliano)  
 
1. Introduction: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of 
Former Combatants 
 
The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants constitutes one 
of the most crucial activities in a post-conflict peacebuilding context with important effects upon 
the wider transitional process from war to peace. The efficient implementation of DDR 
programmes can reassure belligerent parties of the possibility of a permanent cessation of 
hostilities, as they are often the most visible element of the peace agreement. Moreover, a well-
planned and flexible reintegration process can also promote the viability of long-term peace 
locally, nationally and internationally.
1
 Since the end of the Cold War, DDR initiatives have 
been undertaken in more than 25 war-to-peace transition contexts: Afghanistan, Aceh, Angola, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), El Salvador, 
Eritrea, East Timor, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Kosovo, Liberia, Mindanao, 
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tajikistan and Uganda. In 2007, over 
1,129,000 combatants were taking part in DDR programmes in 20 countries at an estimated cost 
of US$ 2 billion; one estimate suggests that it worked out to be around US$1,686 per ex-
combatant. Some 2/3 of former combatants were from African countries; 42% were members of 
the armed forces and 58% belonged to armed militias, guerrilla groups and paramilitary groups. 
Of this statistic, nearly 10% were child soldiers.
2
  
According to the United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
Standards (IDDRS), launched by the UN Secretary-General in December 2006, with the aim of 
promoting an integrated approach between UN agencies and other actors in DDR processes,
3
  
                                                 
1
 Berdal, 1996. Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper 303. London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies. 
2
 Alpaslan Özerdem. 2008 (forthcoming). Post-war Recovery: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. 
London, I.B. Tauris.  
3
 Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) is available at www.unddr.org. 
The IDDRS, which run to more than 700 pages in their full version, arose from a detailed two-year process of 
consultation. They were produced by the Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR, which brought together 15 
agencies, programmes and funds, mainly from the UN. 
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DDR ‗is a complex process, with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic 
dimensions.‘4 The IDDRS defines disarmament as the collection, control and disposal of small 
arms and light weapons and the development of responsible arms management programmes in a 
post-conflict context. Meanwhile, demobilization is defined as a planned process by which the 
armed force of the government and/or opposition or factional forces either downsize or 
completely disband. Having been demobilized and transported to their community of choice, the 
former combatants and their families must establish themselves in a civilian environment. 
Reinsertion assistance, which is intended to ameliorate the process, often includes post-
discharge orientation, food assistance, health and educational support and a cash allowance. 
Finally, reintegration is the process whereby former combatants and their families are 
integrated into the social, economic and political life of (civilian) communities. Thus while 
reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion 
provides short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up 
to one year. At the same time it is important to note that these three phases are interrelated, rather 
than sequential, but they can be thought of as part of a sequence of activities that have to happen 
for a society to recover from armed conflict.  
Two distinct types of DDR programmes can be identified: demilitarisation activities; and those 
taking place in a war-to-peace transition.
5
 The former involves a reduction in the number of 
military personnel following a decisive victory, with a view to reducing military expenditure in 
order to take advantage of a peace dividend. Large scale downsizing as part of peacetime 
demobilization initiatives can also be considered under this heading. However, in the war-to-
peace transition scenario, no clear victor emerges and DDR is undertaken as part of a peace 
settlement. Within this war to peace transition scenario, the outcome of any DDR programme 
depends predominantly upon the political context, and political will among the belligerent parties 
remains the chief criterion for determining success of peacebuilding.  Berdal refers to this 
relationship as ‗an interplay‘ and ‗a subtle interaction‘.
6
 Although a sustainable recovery after 
war cannot be achieved without a successful DDR process, conversely, without a successful 
peacebuilding process the viability of a DDR process would, in general, be questionable.  
This paper looks specifically at the conceptual underpinnings and practical implications of 
reinsertion assistance as a transitional and interim support mechanism which links the 
demobilization and reintegration phases. In practice, ex-combatants once demobilised are in 
theory no longer part of any military structure, yet they may have no livelihood or place to live 
while they wait for the vocational training or employment opportunities which are supposed to 
enable their economic reintegration. Even those returning immediately to agriculture will have to 
wait until their first crops have grown. Interim support plays an important role by meeting basic 
                                                 
4
 Ibid., p. 2. 
5
 Nat Colletta, Markus Kostner & Ingo Wiederhofer. 1996a. The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
6
 Berdal. 1996, p. 73. 
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needs at a time when neither the state nor a reintegration process can do so. While 
demobilization benefits often offer inducement to join a DDR process, reinsertion assistance can 
provide early insurance against an immediate return to violence (individually or collectively). 
Thus as a concept reinsertion has grown to cover the gap between the ‗DD‘ and the ‗R‘ in DDR. 
The IDDRS explicitly states the need to support the life of ex-combatants and their dependants in 
the short term. This aim is pursued in the knowledge that for those who do not already have work 
or land to go to it may be extremely difficult to cover basic needs in the first few months after 
leaving the military unit or demobilisation camp. Not only does reinsertion attempt to alleviate a 
significant humanitarian concern, but it also acts as a measure of insurance against an ex-
combatant‘s return to violence in an effort to secure their basic needs. Another likely objective 
for reinsertion is the provision of early, tangible peace dividends and rewards for combatants, 
heralding further, long-term entitlements in the reintegration phase. Indeed, even when 
reinsertion benefits are not explicitly conceived as a reward or entitlement, they may be seen as 
such by combatants and by the population at large.
7
 At its most negative, this belief in an 
entitlement can lead to expectations that cannot be met, perhaps sparking unrest among 
combatants. In Liberia, for example, riots broke out in camps when ex-combatants‘ expectations 
with regard to the amount of money they would receive were not met.
8
  
The duration of reinsertion as transitional support is largely contingent on whether its objective is 
to fulfil a political function, assist in long-term cantonment, reinforce efforts towards the early 
and complete demobilisation of some or all forces, or provide an entitlement. Other processes do 
influence the duration of the reinsertion phase, such as the time span for registration, the mode of 
demobilization, and funding flows, together with the viability and sustainability of a peace 
agreement, which coalesce to enable a smooth and non-violent transition. The type and duration 
of reinsertion support, moreover, is heavily reliant on how the reintegration process is conceived 
in a given context. For instance in Sierra Leone, reinsertion was planned as a short transitional 
period for ex-combatants to meet basic needs, but was delayed until problems related to 
disarmament, demobilisation, funding and insecurity were overcome and the reintegration phase 
was initiated.
9
 On the whole despite attempts to provide concrete definitions of what reinsertion 
is in a structured and widely-accepted form, as a process it remains hostage to its multiple needs.  
                                                 
7
Mark Knight  & Alpaslan Özerdem. 2004. ―Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reinsertion 
of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace‖, Journal of Peace Research 41(4):499-516;  Faltas, Sami, 
2005. ―DDR Without Camps: The Need for Decentralized Approaches.‖ Conversion Survey 2005: Global 
Disarmament,Demilitarization and Demobilization. Bonn International Center for Conversion. Bonn, Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, at www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/06/54/02/5d16fcf2.pdf; S. Willibald. 2006. ―Does Money 
Work? Cash Transfers to Ex-combatants in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Processes‖, Disasters, 
30, (3), pp. 316–39. 
8
Nelson Alusala. 2008.  Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration in Liberia. DDR and 
Human Security Project Case Study. ISS/CICS,  at http://www.ddr-humansecurity.org.uk,  p. 6.   
9
C. Solomon C. and J. Ginifer. 2008.  DDR in Sierra Leone. DDR and Human Security Project Case Study. CICS, at 
http://www.ddr-humansecurity.org.uk, p. 13. 
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1.1 Structure of the paper 
The paper begins with a conceptual exploration into reinsertion assistance, delineating its 
significance in the sequence of activities which together coalesce as DDR. The second section 
explores the two sides of the reinsertion assistance contents debate, regarding what it should 
involve, namely cash or in-kind assistance. Both forms of reinsertion assistance are discussed in 
detail, to highlight the advantages and disadvantages of cash. Financial Reinsertion Assistance 
subsumes several intricate issues such as selecting beneficiaries and defining target groups. This 
in turn entails clear enunciation of logistics, planning schedules for disbursement, mobilization 
of funds, establishing criteria for different standards, deciding on the quantum of allowance, 
financial education for ex-combatants and ensuring delivery through a non-corruptible 
distribution system. Experience drawn from cross-country cases help illustrate this further.  
The next section turns attention to the ‗in - kind‘ side of the debate and looks at other elements of 
reinsertion assistance. A significant part of this discussion is the ability to decide on the merits of 
different types of in-kind assistance, in particular voucher programmes, in-kind kit and 
equipment, including tangibles like domestic and agricultural tools, shelter materials, and access 
to food rations. 
The final section revisits the sequence of DDR to establish the linkages between short-term and 
interim reinsertion support which acts as a palliative to the immediate needs of demobilized ex-
combatants and the longer-term, resource intensive and multidimensional reintegration 
programmes. At the same time DDR programming has evolved over the years to encompass 
broader agendas, and ambitious mandates, expanding focus from the ex-combatant group – men, 
women and children – to include the wider civilian community, including the disabled, refugees 
and internally displaced people, through indirect linkages with other kinds of transitional 
assistance programming in the post-war recovery phase. However this paper concludes that the 
merit of reinsertion lies in the specificity and focus of its purpose. Diluting its focus by 
burdening reinsertion assistance with unrealistic goals can result in diminishing its utility as 
interim and transitional support for a very limited target group – namely ex-combatants (men, 
women and children). Community involvement and the emphasis on community based strategies 
is a legitimate and important goal, but one which needs to be reserved for longer term 
reintegration programming.  
2. Reinsertion Assistance: A Conceptual Exploration 
A conceptual exploration into the reinsertion phase entails locating the role of reinsertion 
assistance within the DDR spectrum. Broadly speaking, current theorisations of DDR can be 
located within a continuum ranging between the minimalist perspective espoused by the UN, in 
terms of ―improving security‖ on the one hand, and the maximalist understanding of DDR as ―an 
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opportunity for development and reconstruction‖ embraced by the World Bank on the other.10 
The importance of recognizing the complementarities of the minimalist and maximalist 
standpoints is revealed when DDR is conceptualized as a social contract. In the ‗social order‘ of 
war, a weapon has both economic and security value for its owner in the sense that it can be used 
to make economic gains as well as preserve physical security. Hence DDR in such a context can 
be seen as a social contract forged between the combatant and the government and/or 
international community. DDR therefore, represents commitment to, and faith in, the short- and 
long-term creation of an environment where the economic and security value of a weapon is 
gradually eliminated.
11
   
Within this coinage, disarmament and demobilisation are primarily concerned with 
consolidating security on the ground, which in turn can facilitate the initiation and 
commencement of reconstruction and developmental activities.
12
 Reinsertion and reintegration 
however constitute part of wider development affairs, with the long-term goal of reintegrating 
ex-combatants into communities, in terms of financial independence and acceptance by 
community members and leaders. Thus in a sense DDR bridges the ‗controversial ―relief–
development‖ gap‘ that spans short-term emergency and long-term development concerns.13 In 
practice the sequential phases of D/ D / R and R do not follow any linear progressive logic, but in 
this matrix an interesting interim support role comes to be played by reinsertion assistance which 
ties together the two significant processes of demobilization, i.e, the formal renunciation of a 
military identity and its markers and reintegration and the gradual process of transcending into 
civilian roles.  
Most practitioners concede that reinsertion of former combatants following demobilization and 
prior to participation within a reintegration programme constitutes a crucial stage within the 
overall DDR process. Kostner states the importance of reinsertion assistance as follows: 
Upon discharge, an ex-combatant loses his/her source of (formal or informal) income. Immediately 
thereafter, s/he is normally in a critical financial situation until s/he can generate income through 
self-/employment. During this period (the reinsertion phase), an ex-combatant is in need of special 
assistance (transitional safety net) to cover the basic material needs of him/herself and his/her 
family.
14
  
Yet there are a number of conceptual ambiguities surrounding ‗reinsertion‘, especially about who 
or what it is for. The UN definition stresses the transitional nature of the reinsertion phase, since 
it is conceptualised as a bridging mechanism between formal demobilisation and long-term 
                                                 
10
 Muggah, 2006, p.27. 
11
 Knight and Özerdem. 2004, p. 506 
12
 Natascha Spark and Jackie Bailey. 2005. ―'Disarmament in Bougainville: ‗guns in boxes‘'', International 
Peacekeeping, 12:4, pp. 599-603. 
13
 Muggah, 2006, p.241. 
14
Markus  Kostner. 2001. A Technical Note on the Design and Provision of Transitional Safety Nets for 
Demobilization and Reintegration Programs. Mimeo. Washington, DC: World Bank, p. 1. 
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reintegration. This definition allows for reinsertion to begin during the demobilisation phase, and 
therefore before a combatant has legitimately become an ex-combatant.
15
 The UN concept 
focuses on basic needs for (ex-) combatants, ranging from food and simple items to assisting 
with the physical journey from the point of demobilisation to the entry into a ―community‖, all 
the way through to skills training and education. This blurs the boundary between reinsertion and 
reintegration programming.  
The different prescriptions used during the reinsertion phase are a broader sign that the concept 
itself needs contextualizing: the prefix ‗re‘ assumes that the ‗re-insertee‘ will be returning to a 
basic societal state that the combatant remembers or at least understands. This pre-war state does 
not necessarily exist, however. Therefore, while reinsertion has a clear role to play, the 
instruments to implement it may come from a broad ‗basket‘ of tools, some quite sophisticated, 
others still undeveloped, and it may begin and end in a blurred fashion, creating uncertainty for 
both recipients and planners. 
Given the inevitable overlap and interconnectedness, reinsertion assistance has traditionally been 
understood as a stage in reintegration rather than as a stand-alone process.
16
 Traditionally, 
therefore, reinsertion packages have routinely been included as part of the demobilization 
process itself, or labelled as resettlement and rehabilitation packages as in Ethiopia.
17
 Recent 
studies,
18
 however, impart leverage to its significance, by suggesting that a better use of 
international community resources may be to de-link disarmament and demobilization from 
reintegration, relegating reintegration programming to the developmental realm and expanding 
the role of reinsertion assistance with DDR to provide necessary and time bound targeted support 
within a practical and time-bound mandate following disarmament and demobilization.
19
 This 
has resulted in more recent DDR programmes, for instance in the Republic of Congo
20
, Central 
African Republic
21
, and  Sudan
22
, developing the reinsertion segment as a separate stage in the 
sequence of processes involved in DDR.  The next section attempts to create clarity about the 
                                                 
15
 Faltas, 2005. 
16
 N. Ngoma. 2004. ―Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: A Conceptual Discourse‖, in Civil - Military 
Relations in Zambia: A Review of Zambia’s Contemporary CMR History and Challenges of Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration. Pretoria, ISS, at http://www.ddr-humansecurity.org.uk/aell.htm (accessed 
19.06.2008).  
17
 Nat Colletta, Markus Kostner & Ingo Wiederhofer. 1996b. Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition: The 
Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda. Washington, DC: World 
Bank.. 
18
 Kathleen  M. Jennings. 2007. ―The Struggle to Satisfy: DDR through the Eyes of Ex-combatants in Liberia‖, 
International Peacekeeping, 14:2, pp.204 -218; Joao Gomes Porto & Imogen Parsons.  2003. ―Sustaining the Peace 
in Angola: An Overview of Current Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration‖, Article 27. Bonn: Bonn 
International Center for Conversion. 
19
 Porto et al. 2007. 
20
 Alusala. 2008. 
21
 Alusala. 2008. 
22
 Smith. 2008. 
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concept of reinsertion and its content by drawing on its peculiarities and differences from 
reintegration planning and programming. 
2.1 Differences between reinsertion and reintegration 
The field of DDR is littered with several overlapping terminologies which result in a conflation 
of stages and cross-cutting mandates. Taxonomy hence demands that the various and 
overlapping R‘s (namely Reinsertion, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Resettlement) be 
clarified, to impart preciseness to the concept of reinsertion in terms of timing, scope and the 
nature of activities involved. For the purposes of this paper, we focus on the distinction between 
reinsertion and reintegration only. Reinsertion involves ‗stepping stone‘ activities and acts (as 
the World Bank handbook puts it) as ―a safety net to provide support for ex-combatants between 
demobilisation and full reintegration‖. The initial action of bringing an ex-combatant and his/her 
family back into society is often viewed as a stage in reintegration rather than a standalone 
process.
23
 Classical UN approaches to DDR would look at this in terms of ‗entitlement 
packages‘, which is premised on the belief that an ex-combatant and his/her family should be 
provided with the means to ―bridge the difficult period between demobilisation and 
reintegration‖.  
Reintegration on the other hand is as an open-ended process during which the DDR programme 
merges with the ongoing post-conflict process. Kingma for example, views reintegration as not 
one general process but as rather ‗consisting of thousands of micro-stories, with individual and 
group efforts and with setbacks and successes‘.24 According to Berdal, reintegration programmes 
are ‗meant to increase the potential for economic and social reintegration of ex-combatants and 
their families.‘25 Supporting this view, Kingma states that the objective of social reintegration is 
to create an environment in which former combatants and their families feel part of, and are 
accepted by, the community. Political reintegration is the process through which they become a 
full part of decision making processes, while economic reintegration enable them to build up 
their livelihoods by having access to production mechanisms and other types of gainful 
employment.
26
  
Nübler asserts that the long-term objective of reintegration is ―to enhance economic and human 
development and to foster and sustain political stability, security and peace‖.27 It is also crucial 
that the reintegration process recognises and reinforces local reconciliation processes, since 
reintegrating former combatants in society can contribute in the long term to the overall 
                                                 
23
Ngoma, 2002. 
24
Kingma, Kees, 2001. ―Demobilizing and Reintegrating Soldiers: Lessons from Africa‖, in Luc Reychler & Thania 
Paffenholz, ed, Peacebuilding: A Field Guide. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p.  407. 
25
Berdal. 1996, p. 39. 
26
Kees Kingma, ed., 2000. Demobilisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Development and Security Impacts. New 
York: St. Martins, p. 28. 
27
Ingmar Nübler. 1997. Human Resources Development and Utilization in Demobilization and Reintegration 
Programs. Paper 7. Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, p. 3. 
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strengthening of peace and to reconciliation through growing interaction between different 
groups and former warring factions.
28
 In other words, successful reintegration helps in building 
of mutual confidence among former belligerent groups, thereby reducing the risk of renewed 
hostilities.
29
 An important issue that needs to be recognised in the context of reintegration 
programmes is their sheer complexity, they are conducted on far bigger scale, in terms of their 
scope, reach, coverage, funding needs and capacity to bring about transformation at multiple 
levels. 
This does not mean that the disarmament and demobilization and reinsertion phases are 
somehow less complex undertakings, but it is still necessary to bear in mind that reintegration is 
by nature a social, economic and psychological process that is both slow and costly, and if 
implemented effectively, it can indeed increase social justice and contribute to the eradication of 
the root causes of conflict.
30
 As is the case with the disarmament and demobilization phases, 
reintegration is also an intensely political process; indeed, there is perhaps a higher degree of 
political intensity since reintegration would mean a comprehensive involvement in political, 
economic and social reconstruction, ameliorating the root causes of the conflict as much as 
possible.
31
  
The content of reintegration programmes can vary from the provision of access to land and 
education to vocational training and micro enterprise development projects. In fact former 
combatants tend to have limited information about their society and the opportunities available to 
them when they arrive back in their home. If this task has not been covered as part of the 
demobilization phase, then information, counselling and referral services should be established 
in order to provide the vital link between former combatants and the services planned for them. 
The reintegration of former combatants, whether this takes place in a rural or urban area, would 
need first of all to consider a number of basic needs such as housing, infrastructure and services. 
However, for the reintegration of former combatants in rural areas, access to land is probably the 
most important consideration.
32
 Reintegration activities in urban areas, according to one source, 
by contrast need to be more diverse and of longer duration.
33
 In the Ethiopian reintegration 
experience it was explained that ―the urban target group was more complex and difficult than 
that of the rural ex-combatants because of the diverse social and economic backgrounds of the 
ex-combatants, the tightness of the urban labour market‖. Bearing in mind these socio-economic 
characteristics and the likelihood of high unemployment rates in a post-conflict environment, the 
                                                 
28
Kees Kingma & V. Sayers, 1994. Proceedings of the IRG Workshop: Demobilization in the Horn of Africa, Addis 
Ababa. Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion. 
29
Alpaslan Özerdem. 2002. ―Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Afghanistan: 
Lessons Learned from a Cross-Cultural Perspective‖, Third World Quarterly 23(5): 961–975. 
30
Kingma and Sayers. 1994. 
31
Berdal. 1996.   
32Lis Bruthus. 2004. ―The Stockholm Initiative on DDR: Liberia‖ at 
http://forsvar.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/53/96/34e491ae.pdf  (accessed 19.06.2008). 
33
 Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer. 1996a, p. 58. 
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utilisation of large public works programmes in the short term is recommended. In Ethiopia the 
majority of former combatants were referred to short-term public works programmes such as 
agricultural and construction activities for the Ministry of Agriculture, in addition to 
Employment Intensive Works Programmes (EIWP) as an economic stimulator and mass 
employment creation tool.
34
  
One of the correlates of DDR planning which is often overlooked is the overall economic 
situation in which programmes are attempted. Much of the literature on reintegration stresses the 
inevitability of conflict recurrence if ex-combatants return to abject poverty. This raises critical 
issues of sustainable livelihoods and socio-economic wellbeing for both the caseload of 
combatants and their receiving communities. The challenges posed by poverty in this context is a 
critical factor to consider, as it is decisive in the way reinsertion and reintegration benefits are 
needed and translated into programmes. For example, the benefits of newly gained vocational 
skills or micro-enterprise schemes created as part of reintegration could only be realized if there 
is a sufficient demand and absorptive capacity in the economy. The issues of corruption, 
economic insecurity and infrastructural challenges in the financial system can also undermine the 
utility of certain types of reinsertion and reintegration assistance. Therefore, it is essential to 
consider macro economic indicators and issues of poverty in planning DDR responses. 
Another crucial issue with the reintegration process is that of beneficiaries. There is a mistaken 
tendency to regard the caseload of former combatants as homogenous overlooking the significant 
variations based on gender, age, disability, ethnicity, military ranking, education and vocational 
skills which even small caseloads encompass. In fact the range of needs, capacities and 
expectations, of former combatants tends to be wide depending on these 
specificities/characteristics. On the whole transition from reinsertion to reintegration is often 
fraught with delay and considerable difficulty in catering to all beneficiaries and developing 
comprehensive programmes. In fact mistakes, and oversights made during the reinsertion phase 
has the potential to compromise long-term reintegration. The following section tries to wean out 
the basic difference between the reinsertion and reintegration phases with respect to the timing, 
scope and type of activities involved at each stage.  
2.1.1  Timing  
The definition of ‗reinsertion‘ adopted by the UN General Assembly and incorporated into the 
IDDRS suggests that the timing for a reinsertion phase is dictated by the timing of the preceding 
demobilisation phase.
35
 The IDDRS recommends that in light of its primary purpose of meeting 
the basic needs of ex-combatants as they transition into civilian society, reinsertion should last 
for one year only, i.e., before reintegration support commences. Beyond this recommendation, 
there is little discussion of reinsertion timing and procedures in the IDDRS or other policy 
                                                 
34
 ILO, 1997. Manual on Training and Employment Options for Ex-Combatants. Geneva: International Labour 
Office, p. 14. 
35
IDDRS 2006, p. 4. 
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reviews. In view of this, it is advised that reinsertion interventions should provide time-bound, 
basic benefits which have an immediate focus and are delivered over months rather than years. 
Reintegration by contrast can only be achieved over several years, and involves a long-term 
process built on a much broader array of measures and benefits (including counselling, access to 
technology, credit, land and other productive assets), which need to be planned carefully to make 
sure that ex-combatants are sustainably reintegrated within communities. Typically most DDR 
programmes allocate 12 -18 months for the ‗reinsertion‘ phase in which the socio-economic 
needs of ex-combatants and receiving communities are addressed to ease the process of 
reintegration. However, experience suggests, as in Sierra Leone, that the reinsertion process can 
last much longer, and reintegration programs are often delayed.
36
 This interim period can be 
crucial, as delays in assistance can fuel unrest or a return to crime or fighting on the part of 
demobilized combatants unable to sustain themselves. It demands careful attention from policy 
and programme personnel to impart continuity to the DDR process, and also to keep the ex-
combatant target group in the DDR loop. 
2.1.2  Type of Activities  
Re-insertion of ex-combatants is a highly sensitive process and the communities into which ex-
combatants and their families are expected to return need not only to be prepared, but also, in 
some cases, encouraged to receive demobilized personnel. In some instances participation of the 
communities designated to receive ex-combatants in planning and decision-making about who, 
how many and when ex-combatants will be reinserted can be helpful.  Reinsertion benefit 
involves a mix of material and monetary assistance to the families of the ex-combatants easing 
the transition to civilian life; it includes food supplements, indemnity payments and cash 
allowances.
37
 Packages may be distributed upon departure from assembly, upon arrival at the 
destination, or at both points. Several points have come to be institutionalised in the design and 
disbursement of reinsertion assistance: notably, package contents should be designed around the 
ex-combatant‘s family and not simply the individual, as a token of support for their decision to 
demobilize.  
2.1.3  Scope  
While in the reinsertion phase the predominant focus is on the restoration of security and 
therefore on ensuring that ex-combatants are neutralised and their needs attended to, during the 
reintegration phase the focus should shift from ex-combatants to receiving communities.
38
 A 
major debate concerns mode of disbursement for benefit packages. On one side of the debate 
analysts consider that unassimilated soldiers pose a serious threat to law and order, and this in 
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turn provides the rationale for targeting them directly.
39
 Others support targeting of ex-
combatants because they constitute a vulnerable group, which has to cope with important 
transformation challenges, issues of sustainable livelihoods, return and community 
reintegration.
40
 Targeted support however has its critics. It is often perceived as unfair, given that 
the demobilized combatants being targeted are usually the perpetrators of violence and 
instability. Besides, it can create cleavages, exacerbate stigma and problematize community 
acceptance of returning ex-combatants who may be envied on account of the support they 
receive, given that there are many other vulnerable groups - refugees, internally displaced 
persons, women, orphans, and unaccompanied children, who as direct victims of war also 
deserve support.
41
 The alternative to targeted support is providing support directly to the 
community:  advocates of this approach claim that such a move acts as a safety net for all 
children associated with armed groups, particularly girls. The following section elaborates on the 
reinsertion assistance package contents further by addressing various aspects of the cash vs. ‗in 
kind‘ debate in DDR practice. 
2.2 The cash vs. ‘in kind’ debate  
The basic material needs of former combatants and their dependants as discussed in the previous 
section can be divided into two areas: household consumption, such as food, clothes, health care 
and children‘s education; and household investment, such as shelter, agricultural tools and 
kitchen utensils.
42
 The transitional safety net is often planned for a period of six months to a year 
after demobilization and delivered through the provision of cash and/or goods. Traditionally cash 
has been viewed as difficult in context of war, because of weak banking systems, weak markets, 
insecurity, and corruption among other concerns.
43
 However, it is widely used: cash assistance 
can be provided as a monthly amount or in a lump sum, as is most appropriate for the individual 
needs of the former combatant. Not all former combatants will require the same amount of 
reinsertion assistance, therefore criteria for assistance need to be established and implemented in 
a transparent manner. Hence disbursement and distribution of reinsertion assistance has come to 
be mired in a strongly felt debate over its nature and content. Should benefit packages provide 
material or monetary assistance to ex-combatants and their families? Disparate views also arise 
over the proportion of each constituent, along with nuances such as ease, liquidity, problems of 
corruption and cheating among others.  
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Cash payments are a common feature in several phases of DDR. Apart from reinsertion 
assistance, cash payments are also part of demobilization payments in exchange for guns as was 
tried by the UN in El Salvador, Haiti, Liberia, Mozambique, Nicaragua and Somalia; cash as an 
incentive was also used in Eastern Slovenia, Croatia.
44
 Cash has been an integral feature in 
reintegration programmes like that of Sierra Leone,
45
 mainly as periodic allowances to support 
investments in education, training, purchase of goods for trade, or capital investments. In some 
cases cash may not come from an externally funded DDR process, but may be part of a payment 
made by a national government. In southern Sudan, SPLA soldiers received an early cash 
payment from the regional government of South Sudan in lieu of a more regularised salary a year 
after the signing of the CPA. This was perceived by the army and the National DDR 
Commission as a holding payment, providing support and assistance and making up for the 
broader supply difficulties that were affecting morale.
46
  
In the reinsertion stage, cash payments are often preferred over tangibles like food supplements 
and indemnity payments on account of their relative ease of distribution and greater flexibility. 
Its primary appeal to donors lies in simpler logistics and rapid implementation, and the ability to 
give ex-combatants the opportunity to make their own decisions. Cash may be disbursed in a 
lump sum or periodically. Cash allowances may be allotted towards the purchase of clothing, 
food, medical care, agriculture, household effects and housing construction in lieu of or to 
supplement in-kind assistance.  
 Cash and vouchers have now come to be primary alternatives, in particular to food aid, non-food 
items, shelter, seeds, tools and other agricultural commodities such as fertilizer.
47
 Proponents of 
cash and voucher-based approaches argue that they can be more cost-effective and timely, allow 
recipients greater choice and dignity, and have beneficial knock-on effects for local economic 
activity. Skeptics fear that cash and voucher approaches are often impractical due to additional 
risks of insecurity and corruption, and the fact that targeting cash may be more difficult than 
commodities. Even where they are feasible, there are concerns that women may be excluded that 
cash may be misused by the recipients and that it may have negative effects on local economies, 
and could fuel conflict. Others feel that cash-voucher responses sound interesting, but that in 
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practice commodities are perhaps more substantive in terms of meeting immediate needs of 
returning combatants.
48
  
A study carried out by Peppiatt, Mitchell & Holzmann,
49
 asserts that although cash allowances, 
as a transitional safety net, provide a cost-effective and beneficiary-friendly method of delivering 
reinsertion assistance, the problem is that ex-combatants, especially those who have spent many 
years in the army, are not always prudent with their cash payments. While most ex-combatants 
are likely to utilize in-kind assistance for the intended purposes, at the same time in-kind 
assistance does not provide the flexibility the beneficiaries need.
50
 Innovative thinking demands 
halfway strategies which mediate between full-fledged community involvement in reinsertion 
support with providing more direct support to the immediate family of the ex-combatant, which 
can help stabilize the immediate household‘s economic and health condition. For example, 
making provision, for school fee waivers for ex-combatant‘s children and healthcare support for 
an ex-combatant and family.
51
 Vouchers can be highly useful in this context. The following 
sections discuss different elements of reinsertion assistance in greater detail. 
3. Financial Reinsertion Assistance 
 
Cash payments in DDR can be of various types and disbursed at various stages. Examples of 
cash payments include conditional cash transfers (i.e., cash for weapons surrendered as part of 
demobilization exercises), or transitional safety net payments which are usually made in 
installments, as part of reinsertion assistance. Cash payments can be used for household 
consumption and household investment. The following sections will explore the different 
elements and modalities of financial reinsertion assistance by examining the advantages and 
disadvantages of cash payments together with comparative experiences of how cash assistance 
has disparate outcomes in different country contexts. Issues related to the targeting of 
beneficiaries and intricacies such as planning, logistics, mode of mobilization, criteria for 
differentiation, and ways of establishing a non-corruptible distribution system will be 
subsequently elaborated upon. 
3.1 Advantages and disadvantages of cash payments  
The advantages of cash as reinsertion assistance, compared to other kinds of material assistance, 
include the relative ease of distribution, since no transportation or warehousing expenses are 
incurred. If a banking system is operational, the cash can be paid directly into recipients‘ bank 
accounts, thereby reducing the security risks involved in cash distribution and also strengthening 
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the local banking system. However, it is at this point that the difference between cash payments 
during the demobilization and reintegration phases needs to be recognized. As the reinsertion 
initiative serves the purpose of a linkage between demobilization and reintegration, the financial 
reinsertion might be seen as a reintegration initiative. However, as far as this working paper is 
concerned, reinsertion assistance is considered as a transitional safety net. It is accepted that 
there is in fact no clear correlation between the size of the sum issued and the subsequent 
employment rate during the reintegration phase. It is asserted that ―cash payments per se do not 
address the problems of socially integrating ex-combatants into society‖.52 However, a study 
carried out by Peppiatt, Mitchell & Holzmann asserts that cash allowances, as a transitional 
safety net, provide a cost-effective and beneficiary-friendly method of delivering reinsertion 
assistance.
53
 
The southern Africa safety-net studies indicate that beneficiaries tend to use cash for social and 
productive investment only after consumption needs have been met and show how cash can act 
as a stimulant to the local economy. Evidence of squandering – on alcohol and gambling, for 
example – was not found in any of the case studies that looked at how grants were spent. Two 
independent surveys carried out among ex-combatants in Sierra Leone produced similar results: 
the money received was spent on meeting living expenses and family needs,
54
 respectively on 
food and clothing, followed by investments in trading businesses, medical care, housing 
construction, education, marriage and family.
55
 In addition, according to Willibald ―cash 
transfers are perceived as having beneficial knock-on effects on local markets and trade. By 
encouraging local production, it is asserted that disincentive effects often triggered by 
commodity aid are avoided. Moreover, cash is deemed to sidestep the problem of commodity aid 
being sold at a great loss in value, since it can be used directly to meet diverse livelihood 
needs‖.56 
Furthermore, the intent of the cash payment in the Ethiopian case was to assist in the 
establishment of a civilian household. The National Committee for Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration in Sierra Leone specified the objective of the reinsertion 
support, which also included a cash payment, as being ―to facilitate the return and initial 
reintegration of ex-combatants into their home areas, and to help ensure their basic short-term 
necessities are accommodated without being an undue burden on the receiving household‖.57 In 
fact, the Sierra Leone example introduces an important element when considering the reinsertion 
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of former combatants, namely the effect upon the host community and household into which 
they will be reinserted. Former combatants may have to rely on the informal support structures 
available from family and community. Consequently, any cash allowance would help to 
ameliorate the additional drain on resources experienced by the receiving communities and 
households.  
 
Focus group discussions often point to the issue of misuse, but this can reflect a preconceived 
position. Even when misuse is apparent it needs to be contextualised. In Mozambique, for 
example, ex-combatants spent money on alcohol, but as part of village celebrations that helped 
facilitate their social reintegration.
58
 Studies in Sierra Leone show that cash payments were spent 
on meeting living expenses and family needs – food and clothing, followed by a range of 
investments including house-building, marriage, business and education.
59
 Targeting cash 
allowances through in-depth context analysis can help minimise misspending, as can the 
provision of information on the local cash economy and guidance on planning spending. 
Available studies show that cash has appeared to significantly disadvantage women, even when 
they have had access to the DDR process.
60
 Cash transfers have been more successful when 
women have been identified specifically as an early reinsertion group, as commanders have little 
to gain in excluding them from the process. On the contrary, commanders can gain status by 
ensuring women‘s access to reinsertion benefits. Identifying women as a specific target group 
early in a DDR process also provides for a more transparent measure of control, and reduces the 
likelihood of ‗favoured women‘, often not ex-combatants, being registered for DDR support by 
local commanders, or even by peacekeepers.
61
 
 
In line with the conceptual and practical ambiguities which conflate the reinsertion-reintegration 
axis, there exists a weapons buy back – inducement vs. reinsertion-entitlement logic premised on 
the belief that during the disarmament stage of DDR processes, inducements are needed to trade 
in weapons, since ―the warring parties expect something in return for their preparedness to 
disarm‖,62 and that ex-combatants as a vulnerable group in the post war period are entitled to 
special assistance that smoothes their reinsertion into host communities.
63
 (However, it is 
necessary to make a distinction between the payment in ‗buy-back‘ programmes for disarmament 
and financial assistance in reinsertion. This is probably one of the most challenging aspects of 
financial reinsertion assistance as it can easily be construed as enticement to buy the complicity 
of ex-combatants and their disarmament. It should be noted that there are  no easy answers for 
avoiding such a perception from the war-affected community at large but this issues can be 
tackled in more innovative ways. 
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Most would agree that a mix of cash and in-kind assistance is best suited to  meeting the needs of 
ex-combatants in the reinsertion phase. For instance in Mozambique, both cash and in-kind 
assistance was offered under the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS) and Information Referral 
Service (IRS) program managed by the UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination 
(UNOHAC); this was one of the best examples of programs that provided incremental financial 
assistance and job market information while promoting integration into the local community.
64
 
The thrust was on providing demobilized soldiers with 18 months of subsidies in the form of 
cash disbursements. Thus a needs assessment and a proper review of the local economy‘s 
capacity to absorb cash inflation, together with an ex-combatant‘s needs profile and an 
assessment of the sustainability of the peace process can help inform the decision on opting for 
conditional cash transfer strategies.
65
 Former combatants also received vocational kits that 
consisted of agricultural tools, seeds, and food rations for up to three months, with ex-
combatants being given financial assistance before leaving the cantonment sites.
66
 In Liberia, 
cash was a component of both demobilization and reinsertion phases. However, payment of 
US$75 as a demobilization benefit became a source of violence and unruliness among ex-
combatants. The initial programme was redesigned later, and the demobilization payment was 
scrapped by UNMIL when the DDR programme recommenced in 2004. A reinsertion allowance 
of US$ 300 was paid in two instalments, with the first US$ 150 tranche given at the completion 
of a two to three-week demobilisation process, and the second US$ 150 tranche of the reinsertion 
allowance paid following the return to their home community three months later. This experience 
suggests that cash as assistance is better suited to reinsertion than the demobilization and 
disarmament phases on account of the problematic ―weapons for cash image‖.67  
   
3.2 Beneficiaries and issues of targeting 
Former combatants are a heterogonous group, including men, women, boys and girls, with varied 
characteristics and needs, which may face different difficulties and obstacles in the DDR 
process. When assessing the diversity of caseloads, there is a need to establish the beneficiaries 
and target of reinsertion assistance. Recent practice acknowledges that special attention needs to 
be given to the fate of former combatants, who have been disabled as a result of the conflict, as 
well as female combatants and child soldiers.  
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In fact that the IDDRS recommend a gender-responsive approach in all phases and activities of 
DDR from the negotiation and needs assessment of the process to its implementation and 
evaluation. Mainstreaming gender in reinsertion is an imperative given that, in many cases, 
women in the company of male combatants are seen only as dependents, regardless of whether 
they bore arms or engaged in violence. If they were, in fact, fighters, they often appear to be 
unable to claim DDR assistance. Moreover, often the structure of assistance packages runs 
counter to the well-being of female ex-combatants
68
; although efforts have been made in recent 
DDR programmes to rectify this shortcoming as was the case in Burundi.
69
  
 
With respect to child soldiers, the case of Liberia, where this group was provided money in equal 
proportion to adult combatants, the experience was negative. Child ex-combatants reportedly 
used the cash to purchase ―marijuana and other drugs that are plentiful in Liberia‖ or had it taken 
away by their former commanders.
70
 Contrary to this, in Sierra Leone there is some evidence that 
children gave money to their families. However, on the whole it has come to be accepted that 
cash payments as part of demobilization of child soldiers is not a good option.
71
  
 
Most demobilization and reintegration processes have treated families as secondary 
beneficiaries. This means that it is up to the soldier to share benefits with the household, even 
though the soldier might misuse these benefits. Cursory observations suggest that former fighters 
in Sierra Leone did give a share of their money to spouses and other female household members, 
as they also did in Somalia, where ex-combatants‘ wives had to sign the contract that would 
subsequently lead to cash payments. Such best practices are currently being applied in Sudan, 
where male ex-combatants are encouraged to bring along their wives when collecting the cash 
allowance—they receive an additional US$ 100 if they show up as a pair.72 Besides it might be 
more expensive and difficult to target all dependents given that family members must be 
identified and registered. One possibility is that of conducting an intra-household analysis to 
evaluate how benefits might be shared and also carry out an assessment of the male ex-
combatant‘s acceptance in the case of benefits given directly to families. A strong sensitization 
campaign targeting ex-combatants and communities could trigger community pressure on the 
recipient of benefits to use them fairly and wisely.  
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Cumulative evidence from the field has proven that women and families tend to benefit very 
little from payment schemes, such as with the DRP in Angola, since demobilized men do not feel 
obliged to use their pay in the best interest of their dependants.
73
 While giving some benefits 
directly to families might solve this problem, this strand has also given rise to an appeal that 
community involvement in reinsertion can be a possible option.  The ongoing DDR in Sudan is a 
test case for this approach. However, early evaluations of the process suggest that despite its 
emphasis on balancing support to individual combatants with support to communities, problems 
have been encountered in the practical aspects of operationalising community support. 
Reinsertion and transitional assistance consisted of a one-off cash payment for transportation and 
resettlement immediately after demobilization, non-food items to support the resettlement, three 
months of food ration distributed on a monthly basis and a monetized reinsertion support.
74
  
 
Flowing from a broader debate within DDR theory and practice of whether the target should be 
the individual combatant or the broader community, there have been recent calls of involving the 
community in reinsertion support as well.
75
 The underlying rationale is to mitigate animosity felt 
by the community towards returning ex-combatants, who are viewed as perpetrators of violence 
and also beneficiaries of DDR programmes, by involving the community in the design and 
disbursement of reinsertion support. This community rooted approach seeks to create a more just 
distribution of benefits in the recovery phase. Although preliminary reports from Eastern DRC 
suggest that financial focus on the individual ex-combatant has combined with a lack of broader 
demobilization for the individual to produce a powerful and political group identity, the need to 
deliver cash assistance at a community level seems to be too vague a goal, hence in this paper, 
our position is that while the emphasis on community based strategies is a legitimate and 
important goal, this logic must be reserved for the more long term and comprehensive 
reintegration programmes for practical purposes. The merit of the reinsertion phase lies in its 
interim support character and in its strictly defined mandate of helping a particular section of the 
war-affected, namely ex-combatants.  
3.3 Planning and logistics 
Overall, five primary issues must be addressed when planning cash reinsertion assistance: the 
mobilization of funds, differentiation criteria, the amount of the allowance, financial education 
and the development of a non-corruptible identification system. Alongside the overall challenges 
of the DDR process in general, mobilization of the necessary funds for financial reinsertion 
assistance is obviously the first obstacle to be overcome in this process. For example, although 
the donor community provided 89 per cent of funds for the DDR process in Uganda, there was a 
substantial overlap of activities owing to delays in the mobilization of funds, and consequently, 
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there were occasions when funds had to be loaned from the Ministry of Defence.
76
 The World 
Bank plans for demobilization in Cambodia in 2000 also faced similar funding problems, as both 
donors and government failed in their mobilization of funds. Consequently, the original plan for 
a severance payment of US$1,200 per demobilized Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) 
soldier was reduced to US$240 per veteran. The further demobilization of RCAF soldiers is 
likely to face problems with the provision of necessary funding.
77
  
 
In line with the inherent challenges of providing cash payments in post conflict environments, 
the DDR process in Sierra Leone faced problems like the ―…absence of banks in various parts of 
the country, movement of [a] huge quantity of cash across the country, security for the process 
and co-ordination of various agencies involved within a tight timeframe‖.78 Willibald notes that 
despite initial hiccups, these challenges were overcome by contracting payment officers to 
deliver the cash by means of helicopter and under UN security to district headquarters for 
subsequent collection by ex-combatants.
79
 The results were positive and reflected in ex-
combatant survey responses which ―considered the process of paying their benefits to have been 
transparent and efficient‖,80 with delays in delivery being the major cause of the process being 
considered as inefficient. The Sierra Leone case also suggests that, from a logistical point of 
view and despite the difficulties of a post-conflict environment, cash was the superior form of 
assistance, in light of the inconducive weather conditions during the time of ex-combatant 
demobilization: rains would have made delivering in-kind assistance far more difficult.
81
  Hence 
various related factors need to be taken into account when planning and developing logistical 
support for the reinsertion phase. 
3.3.1  Differentiation criteria 
Experience indicates that criteria for differentiating the amounts paid to particular groups must 
be clearly and transparently established. This is particularly important in order to avoid 
discrimination, for example against female former combatants. However, the Ugandan 
reinsertion process adopted an approach based on egalitarian differentiation. It was the same for 
all former combatants, irrespective of their rank, age or years of service. In contrast, during the 
process in Ethiopia, the criteria for differentiating amounts and types of reinsertion assistance 
included length of service, location of settlement (urban or rural) and level of disability.
82
  In the 
Namibian experience, the need for reinsertion assistance was not foreseen at the beginning. 
However, protests from former combatants and the resulting threat to security meant that 
retrospective reinsertion assistance was eventually provided, but the two criteria for 
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differentiating payment – being unemployed and in service at the time the decision was made – 
proved difficult to establish. Furthermore, the payments were considered as severance pay and 
were therefore not calculated on the basis of projected needs.
83
  
 
The amount of the allowance, as a general rule, should broadly correspond to the level of 
household income of the general population in order that it does not cause resentment within the 
community in which the former combatant will settle.
84
 In other words, establishing the amount 
of reinsertion assistance must be based upon information gathered from combatants and the 
prevailing socio-economic environment into which they are to be inserted. Also, the amount 
should be calculated so as to avoid creating a disincentive to find employment. Criticism of the 
reinsertion assistance in Mozambique suggests that it was too generous, creating a sense among 
former combatants that they were special and they could therefore expect and demand more from 
the government and the international community.
85
 DDR experiences in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone also suggest that the provision of cash to ex-combatants can indeed elicit community 
resentment. The final evaluation report of the Sierra Leone DDR programme asserted that ―[t]he 
lure of the Le 600,000 reinsertion benefit encouraged corruption at the commander level‖.86   
 
3.3.2  Amount of the allowance and financial education 
In addition to the level of financial assistance, another important issue is whether this should be 
paid as a lump sum or by instalments. The World Bank (1993) study shows that former 
combatants tend to have little success in investing lump sum payments for productive purposes, 
suggesting that cash payments without financial planning sessions are of limited utility. 
Depending on their context, former combatants may have little or no experience in managing 
money or operating within a cash economy. In such circumstances, cash payments should be 
combined with the provision of finance education sessions as an integral component of the 
reinsertion assistance. Consequently, the preferred approach should entail payment by 
instalments that decrease over time, thereby reducing dependency and clearly establishing that 
the assistance is strictly time-limited. For example, the process in Angola which was initiated in 
2002 plans to provide former combatants with one cash payment of US$100 in addition to a 
severance payment in the form of three-months salary.
87
  
 
Burundi is a case in point here. The National Programme on Demobilization, Reinsertion and 
Reintegration (NPDDR) had a significant reinsertion component. This included a fixed 
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reinsertion allowance (to the equivalent value of 18 months‘ wages, calculated according to army 
salary scales) given to each demobilized person after leaving the Demobilisation Centre (DC), to 
assist with socio-economic reinsertion. The 18 months‘ pay was issued in installments,  with  
nine months‘ wages being paid on leaving the DC, and three tranches of three months‘ pay, 
deposited into the ex-combatant‘s bank account at regular intervals. A unique transportation fee 
of US$ 20 is also given to every demobilized person, regardless of his or her destination. The 
total reinsertion benefit (Indemnité Transitoire de Subsistance — ITS) for ex-combatants and ex-
soldiers was differentiated by rank, and amounted to a minimum of FBU 566,000 per candidate 
(indexed on the ex-FAB salary scale), which was paid in cash. Upon discharge from the DCs, 
each demobilised person receives the first of the four installments as shown in Table 1 below.
88
 
 
Table 1: Reinsertion payments by rank and schedule in Burundi National Defence Force 
(in Burundi Francs)
89
 
Rank 
category 
 
In 
Demobilisation 
Centre 
4 months 
after 
demobilisatio
n  
7 months after 
demobilisation 
10 months 
after 
demobilisati
on 
Total 
Troops 300,000 88,676 88,676 88,676 566,028 
Non 
Commissio
ned 
Officers 
570,000 168,272 168,272 168,272 1,074,816 
Junior 
Officers 
600,000 175,162 175,162 175,162 1,125,486 
Senior 
Officers 
970,000 284,179 284,179 284,179 1,822,536 
 
1,770,000 518,524 518,524 518,524 3,325,572 
Source: ONUB, DDR-SSR Newsletter, 03 to 31 March 2006 – Issue 26/2006, cited in Lamb 
(2008). 
The next phase consisted of subsequent payments which were made through the banking system 
in the place where each former fighter resettles. This approach enabled ex-combatants and ex-
soldiers to familiarise themselves with the banking system, and indirectly made access to credit 
easier. The remaining three installments were paid to ex-combatants once they have resettled in 
their community of choice over a 10-month period. The money allowed the ex-combatants to 
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meet the expenses that come with her or his social re-entry into the community and finance a 
basic livelihood for about 18 months. Initial findings by ONUB are that the process has been a 
success and most ex-combatants are not experiencing difficulty in accessing these payments, and 
that the money is generally used well. This process of phasing the reinsertion package also 
allows the NCDRR to ensure ex-combatants not only receive assistance for the first 10 months 
after their return to civilian life, but also enabled them to ―buy‖ extra time for preparing 
reintegration assistance activities in communities where ex-combatants and ex-soldiers settled.
90
  
3.3.3  Non-corruptible distribution system 
Finally, a non-corruptible identification system must be established during demobilization that 
will allow former combatants to receive their reinsertion assistance. The establishment of a non-
corruptible identification system is imperative in forming and maintaining confidence in the 
distribution of reinsertion assistance, among both the beneficiaries and the donors contributing 
towards the DDR programme. The payment list needs to be complete and accurate, former 
combatants should be registered and provided with a non-transferable photographic ID and 
benefits should be tracked via the DDR programme management information system.
91
 Other 
factors to be taken into account before planning community cash transfers around reinsertion 
include funding requirements, the allocation system and the support needed during the ‗mobile‘ 
phase, when a returnee is physically undertaking the journey to their (new) home. New 
technologies are beginning to play a role in cash transfer as well. The ability to move money 
through mobile phone systems has risen dramatically in the last few years. Systems such as 
‗Celpay DRC‘ provide mobile phone based banking and money transfer, allowing transitional 
payments to be made country-wide while dramatically reducing the logistic and security burden, 
although not without raising problems of its own. On the flip side, it left ex-combatants 
vulnerable when returning from the highly visible collection points. Conditional cash transfers 
which operate under stricter supervision may create the necessary check on cheating in terms of 
distribution systems. In the Republic of the Congo (RoC), there was reportedly little malpractice 
in terms of distribution due to good supervision, which ensured that the money was spent in 
accordance with prior agreements.
92
 
4. Other Elements of Reinsertion Assistance 
 
Cash allowances should not be considered to be exclusive. For example in Angola, in addition to 
cash, former combatants were provided with in-kind kit, including clothes, domestic tools, food 
and agricultural tools.
93
 The section below explores different facets of reinsertion assistance such 
as the role of voucher programmes, in-kind kit, food aid, domestic and agricultural tools and 
shelter materials in easing the reinsertion of former combatants into their communities. 
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4.1 Voucher programmes 
Vouchers are often used in place of cash in humanitarian assistance packages and emergency 
relief support. Several factors coalesce to prompt this choice, including donor constraints, a 
desire to ensure that a particular type of good or commodity is purchased by the recipients, on 
account of security fears about negative effects of cash flows, or because of market weaknesses. 
Vouchers may be denominated in money terms or in physical quantities of specific commodities. 
They are normally restricted to particular commodities, such as food or seeds, and may be more 
effective than cash if the objective is not just to transfer income to a household, but to meet a 
particular goal, such as improving nutrition or boosting agricultural production. Although 
voucher programmes generally require more planning and preparation than the distribution of 
cash (including agreements with traders so that vouchers can be exchanged easily), they often 
provide a useful alternative to commodity-based distributions, particularly seeds.
94
  
 
Other possible challenges with a voucher system would likely to be with the quality of products 
and services disbursed and the way these issues could be monitored as part of the reinsertion 
assistance phase in a given context. Any shortcomings with such provisions would be reflected 
negatively for the overall success of DDR process and it is critical that such voucher elements 
would pay adequate attention not only to the demand side of the equation but also the supply 
side. One of the sectors where vouchers can be useful is for operationalising free health services 
included as part of the reinsertion assistance package. The IDDRS recommends that in order to 
mitigate possible resistance of communities to receiving returning ex-combatants, the latter can 
be issued employment vouchers to access employment opportunities.
95
 In fact vouchers can also 
be used as part of reinsertion assistance to target children of former combatants to cover some of 
their critical financial needs for the transitional period up to one year. Assistance could include 
school fees, books and uniforms, operationalised through a system of vouchers redeemable at 
schools and shops: this approach could significantly assist ex-combatants in terms of their 
familial support responsibilities. 
4.2 In-kind kit 
The in-kind component is a strong feature of reinsertion assistance programmes across much of 
Africa and in other continents, although entitlements vary by country, as well as by recipient 
(male, female, child). In-kind kits used in typical DDR programmes, for example, may include 
clothing (T-shirt, trousers, underwear, socks, shoes), eating utensils (cups, plates, cooking pots), 
hygiene materials (toothbrush, toothpaste, soap, plastic buckets) and basic household goods 
(blankets, sleeping mats, jerry cans, bags, plastic tarpaulin for shelter). Women may also receive 
wraps, packages of sanitary napkins, and kits with baby supplies.  
 
Case evidence from the recently concluded DDR experience in the Central African Republic 
(CAR), however, suggests that in-kind kits can also be susceptible to corrupt practices and result 
in dissatisfaction, disappointment among ex-combatants. For instance, in the CAR the reinsertion 
kit consisted of US$ 700, of which 10 % was paid as a training levy paid to a training institution 
to which the ex-combatant was attached. The remainder was given to the ex-combatant in 
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material form for the ex-combatant to start a business enterprise. Initially, about three months 
passed before the reinsertion kits arrived, causing panic amongst ex-combatants, who regularly 
demonstrated in the streets of Bangui. When the kit did arrive, it included cement, roofing sheets, 
fishing kits, livestock keeping and US$ 150 as a transitional safety allowance. However, a large 
number of ex-combatants rejected the reinsertion kits alleging that the kits were overpriced, and 
could be sourced more cheaply from elsewhere if they were given cash. They alleged that there 
had been misappropriation of funds, and instead agitated for cash payments, abandoning the kits 
on site.
96
  
 
4.2.1  Food aid 
Food aid programmes in support of DDR can be offered at various stages, but they play a 
particularly important role during the reinsertion period and often constitute take-home rations as 
part of reinsertion packages. Other possible food-for-work and/or food-for-training programmes 
can be offered over during the reinsertion period of normally one year in order to strengthen the 
food security of ex-combatant households. Vulnerable groups amongst the war-affected 
population such as children associated with armed forces and groups, war-disabled ex-
combatants, pregnant and lactating women, and those beneficiaries affected by HIV/AIDS or 
other chronic illness can also be special targets of food assistance during the reinsertion phase.
97
 
In much of Africa, on-site feeding programmes as well as take-home rations have been an 
important inducement to children to participate in demobilization and reintegration programmes.  
 
The following is an example of a food basket for the reinsertion phase, providing the 
recommended overall nutritional value for food aid during this phase of approximately 2,100 
kcal per day. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A general guideline is that food should be provided for three months; factors like timing and 
expected yields/production of the next harvest and prospects for the re-establishment of 
employment and other income-generating activities are criteria for deciding on the length of food 
support.
98
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TAKE-HOME RATION 
(DAILY) 
 
Maize 450 g 
Pulses 50 g 
Oil 30 g 
Salt 5 g 
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4.2.2  Domestic and agricultural tools 
In countries where the large majority of ex-combatants are rurally based, reinsertion support may 
also include an agricultural kit with seeds and basic tools. In the past, DDR programmes such as 
in Sierra Leone overlooked the importance of agricultural package for providing sustainable 
livelihoods to returning combatants. In this context, Arthy notes that although apparently the 
DDR agricultural package was a less attractive option for former combatants than the skills 
training packages, with time many of the ex-combatants trained in vocational skill were later 
forced to fall back on agriculture (or mining) due to the limited absorption capacity of the labour 
market.
99
  
 
The Sierra Leone case suggests that agricultural sector and allied tools and benefits (vouchers for 
seeds, fertilizers etc) should be a key area of emphasis in reinsertion and reintegration 
programmes for agrarian economies. Ex-combatants who were forced to join agricultural 
activities in light of poor employability in other sectors in Sierra Leone did so without the 
implements and tools that would have been at their disposal had they been able to receive help 
under the DDR programme. Even in the case of Liberia, one study found that spatial distribution 
of reintegration outcomes in terms of urban-rural divide was a key factor in the successful 
transition to civilian life.
100
 Former combatants who returned to a rural life, and opted for 
agriculture, were over time more self-sustainable and integrated within their communities 
compared to ex-combatants who remained in Monrovia, and opted for vocational training 
schemes, since skills like carpentry had limited demand in the labour market. Even in the case of 
El Salvador, access to cultivable land was an important feature of reintegration benefits (given 
that reinsertion was not a separate feature in the El Salvador case) disbursed amongst former 
FMLN fighters.
101
 Another case of relevance here is that of CAR. Although in choosing their 
reinsertion packages, ex-combatants were advised to select skills that they were already engaged 
in and/or were familiar with, most (nearly 48%) opted for retail trade because of the cash or 
business start up capital offered. However, the high incidence of enterprise failure in subsequent 
evaluation of the programme
102
 should inform the need for strengthening the agricultural option 
in reinsertion packages for future DDR programmes. 
  
4.2.3  Shelter materials 
Immediately following their return to their community, the most pressing need for former 
combatants and their dependants is often finding shelter. Assistance can be given either as a cash 
subsidy or via material inputs such as roofing materials.
103
 Nevertheless, material assistance, in 
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terms of roofing materials and tools, incurs higher transitional costs. In addition,  these materials 
are unlikely to meet the specific needs of individual former combatants and might be sold by 
former combatants for cash to meet more pressing needs. The special needs of female former 
combatants should also be borne in mind in this process. For example, in urban areas their 
housing needs could be covered through the safety net by assisting them with rent fees for a 
limited period. For those who are in rural areas, cash can be provided for materials for 
constructing or rehabilitating a house. However, women, particularly those who are single heads 
of households, can face problems in this process, since they often lack the necessary technical 
skills. Therefore, the transitional safety net for female former combatants could also include the 
payment of essential labour for construction of their houses.
104
  
5. Linking Reinsertion to Reintegration 
 
Having developed a conceptual framework for locating the role and significance of reinsertion 
assistance in DDR, this section tries to wean forth the various ways in which reinsertion 
assistance can aid reintegration efforts for former combatants and their receiving communities. 
The key role of reinsertion as explicated earlier lies in the stop gap nature of its support, since it 
helps to ease the transition from military life in the post demobilization phase. This interim 
period when ex-combatants wait for the commencement of reintegration programmes such as 
vocational and skills training; educational catch up programmes; and economic reintegration 
support, provides an important opportunity for undertaking the kind of assessment necessary to 
inform broad reintegration plans. In the contextualisation of reintegration needs and provisions, 
one of the most critical factors to bear in mind would be the resettlement environment. The ex-
combatants might be returning to either their home communities or alternate communities far 
away from family roots, perhaps on account of a complete decimation of their family network 
over the war period, or motivated by feelings of fear, rejection, and revenge in communities 
where they caused death, destruction. In Sierra Leone survey results indicate that nearly 75% of 
Civil Defence Forces (CDF) fighters returned to the communities in which they had lived before 
the war began, but only 34% of Revolutionary United Front (RUF) combatants returned home.
105
 
These decisions can be explained in part by the willingness of communities to accept returned 
fighters. Ex-combatants may also choose to resettle in the home communities of their spouse or 
partner; this choice may relate to a rural-urban spatial distribution. In this context, the ability of 
rural communities to absorb returning combatants has been a primary focus of recent community 
based reintegration initiatives in Sierra Leone.  
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If the reinsertion activities are not linked with reintegration needs effectively, there are likely to 
be a number of challenges in the economic reintegration of ex-combatants. Meaningful 
employment or livelihood opportunities, particularly in urban areas where ex-combatants are 
likely to be at the fringes in terms of economic and political access, are essential for preventing 
ex-combatants from returning to fighting or relying on familiar combatant social networks for 
survival. A survey conducted in Lofa county, in Liberia, which shares borders with Sierra Leone 
and Cote d‘Ivoire, perhaps the loci of most intensive fighting during the second civil war (1997-
2003); suggests that ex-combatants often perceive themselves as being at an economic 
disadvantage, with respect to a basket of issues such as lack of marketable skills (40%), lack of 
education (23%), and discrimination against ex-combatants (25%).
106
 In Monrovia, Utas (2005) 
noted that most young ex-combatants who could not go back to rural areas and stayed in the 
capital; were engaged in wage labour such as construction work, collection of scrap metal and 
garbage for resale, drug peddling and petty thievery. In this activity, they relied on the close 
connections with the army (AFL) and hence many in the ex-combatant group became part of a 
corrupt security nexus and could not reintegrate effectively. 
 
Understanding the demographic and socio-economic characteristics, and the social cohesion and 
occupational trends in the pre-war period, would make it easier to assess workforce skills, that 
can help address the challenges of posed by the limited absorptive capacity of the local economy 
and of the labour market into which ex-combatants are returning. In other words, utilising this 
period effectively can provide a stronger basis for reinsertion packages as well as for future 
reintegration plans. The reinsertion stage would also provide the time to cross-reference this 
information with combatants‘ profiles to identify suitable strategies for training and job creation 
in social and economic reintegration. With an eye to this window of opportunity, there may be a 
need to design specific programmes that cater for the 12-18 month reinsertion period, which can 
provide the necessary infrastructural framework for ex-combatants to feel part of DDR by being 
formally registered, periodically reporting to a particular programming site. Such exercises can 
provide ex-combatants sufficient time to adjust to the process of becoming civilian. However, 
there are several key issues which often plague the reinsertion phase, particularly in the context 
of delayed commencement of reintegration benefits. The section below discusses two main 
issues in this context: coordination as part of how the different mandates of various agencies 
impact on reinsertion; and funding dynamics, which is relevant for every stage of DDR, but more 
so in reinsertion given the need to leverage its significance within DDR programming. 
5.1 Coordination issues 
One of the primary conditions for ensuring an effective relationship between peacebuilding and a 
DDR process is the coordination of activities. Experience shows that a wide range of 
programmes are carried out by a variety of agents, actors preferably, but not necessarily, 
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coordinated by a single vision for the future. Inter-agency cooperation in the planning and 
implementation of DDR programmes, operations, in particular policy and strategic level 
coordination between national and international actors is a desirable goal, but one which is 
lamentably lacking in practice. This creates confusion, overlap and a lack of clear demarcation of 
responsibilities, which afflicts every stage of DDR programming, but in particular has a negative 
impact on the linkages between reinsertion and reintegration. This lack of clear demarcation is 
because no single international agency has a dedicated mandate for every stage of DDR 
programming, and while various models of leadership have been tried, with various levels of 
national ownership and involvement,  most DDR is still managed and administered by various 
international agencies.
107
 
 
While historically many DDR programmes were very much security centred in their mandate 
and addressed solely the ex-combatant group as targets and beneficiaries, of late there has been a 
perceptible shift of emphasis towards community based approaches at each stage. This has 
resulted in the inclusion of a diverse set of international agencies apart from UN mandated peace 
keeping missions to pilot different stages in DDR in a single country. So far as role performance 
is concerned UN peacekeeping operations are often mandated to undertake, or oversee, the 
disarmament of belligerent factions. Hence, the UN perspective is primarily focused upon the 
initial phase of DDR programmes, namely disarmament, particularly the approach of the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO). The World Bank‘s perspective, on the 
other hand, is coloured by the organisation‘s involvement in the latter phases of DDR 
programmes: demobilization and reintegration. However, a number of other international 
organizations such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Labour Office (ILO) have increasingly 
become critical players in the demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration stages.  
 
The IOM has considerable cross-country experience with a specialized focus on Information, 
Counselling and Referral Services (ICRS), along with community revitalization programmes 
(CRPs), notably in Angola, Mozambique, Haiti, and Afghanistan. In addition, the UNDP and 
USAID are at the forefront in evolving community based reintegration strategies in West Africa 
and the ILO has traditionally been a key player in attaching significance to the criticality of 
economic reintegration and vocational training, to achieve a successful civilian transition. These 
international donors and agencies have to liaise with a complex array of national and local 
government authorities, international financial institutions, bilateral donors, international and 
local NGOs and community-based organisations who are involved in the DDR process at 
different times and in different ways. As a result of these varied mandates and focus areas the 
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thrust of each phase, with respect to performance and delivery of services tends to be tempered 
and shaped by the priorities and preferences of the agency or actor involved. 
 
While the DDR architecture fundamentally affects the relationship between the different DDR 
phases, only limited efforts have been made to ensure that institutional arrangements are 
configured in a way that facilitates coordination, either within the UN family or beyond. 
Disagreements are rife over which institutions are best suited to manage DDR processes, and 
which approaches should be adopted.  When a peacekeeping mission is set up, specific planning 
for DDR is incorporated into overall planning for the mission. A lead DDR department or agency 
within the UN is usually identified and tasked with conducting assessments that will inform the 
eventual UN mandate as regards DDR. The strategic development phase which follows the 
assessment stage establishes which actors are involved, in addition to operational frameworks, 
implementation plans and budgetary requirements. Therefore, while much of the detailed 
planning is undertaken in-country, the structure and principles underpinning the DDR process 
are pre-configured, frequently with limited attention paid to parallel processes or programming. 
This lack of flexibility is compounded by capacity constraints, particularly in the latter stages of 
DDR. A comparison of institutional capacities to plan and implement DDR activities in Liberia 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) highlighted deficiencies within DPKO, UNDP 
and the World Bank, in particular in areas relating to the reintegration component and the more 
civilian elements of DDR.
108
  
 
This multiplicity of actors also characterises the implementation process, with more than a dozen 
additional UN agencies and international organisations involved, in addition to international and 
local NGOs. The plethora of agencies and institutions has resulted in both overlaps and gaps in 
planning and implementation. For instance, where there is a UN peacekeeping mission, DPKO 
traditionally has responsibility for the disarmament and demobilisation of ex-combatants. It is 
less likely that the mandate will include reintegration. In the absence of a UN mandate, national 
military strategies often address disarmament and demobilisation, but again reintegration is not 
usually part of this process. In such cases, reintegration is left to other actors, such as UNDP, the 
World Bank, the IOM and NGOs, making it difficult to achieve a coordinated and integrated 
approach. Reinsertion as a post demobilization exercise is also subject to similar ambiguity: apart 
from Burundi and the RoC, which are examples of recent DDR exercises which had a distinct 
reinsertion component,
109
 most programmes have treated reinsertion either as part of the 
demobilization benefits package or as the first stage of reintegration. 
 
A number of proposals have been developed and piloted to foster more integrated and joined-up 
approaches to DDR. The SIDDR has recommended ‗parallel programming‘ so that DDR 
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processes can be undertaken in conjunction with other early recovery initiatives, and proposes 
joint funding to support this. In Haiti, the original proposal set out elements of a classic DDR 
programme, such as the formal cantonment of ex-combatants, and linked this to a community-
centred strategy to reduce violence. However, disagreement over content and funding meant that 
the integrated DDR Section rapidly fractured, with DPKO continuing to argue for encampment 
approaches and UNDP promoting ‗community violence prevention and development 
committees‘ around the country. The DDR Section was thus effectively administering two 
separate programmes, each competing for priority.
110
 This is because military planners at DPKO 
continue to adhere largely to a narrow reading of DDR, focusing on the security and military 
aspects of disarmament and demobilisation. UNDP, however, has a broader human security 
approach, focusing on the more ‗civilian‘ aspects of reintegration and enhancing the absorptive 
capacities of areas of return. This resulted in a confused approach to reinsertion which was 
treated within the two security vs. community perspectives by the two different agencies. 
 
The IDDRS represent the first major effort to establish structures and methods to underpin 
cooperation and linkages between DDR-related programming. However, even at the policy level 
there are faults. The structure proposed by the IDDRS relies heavily on pre-existing architecture 
and staff. It adopts a ‗top-down‘ approach, and thus is not truly integrated at the country level. 
The guide to conducting DDR assessments set out by the IDDRS requires the identification of 
reinsertion processes and other transitional planning efforts, but beyond that no mechanism, 
guidance or institutional capacities are outlined to ensure that this is achieved. Furthermore, the 
IDDRS identify the DDR process as the key driver and decision-maker on how reinsertion 
should occur and how it should be linked with reintegration phase. Given this top-down 
approach, inherent tensions between the different approaches of DPKO and UNDP remain 
unresolved and are deeply embedded in the design and delivery of reinsertion and reintegration 
support.  
 
Recent efforts to pilot the integrated approach enunciated in the IDDRS in Haiti and Sudan, 
provide early lessons which highlight the challenges inherent in operationalising integrated 
approaches in practice. The pilots showed the importance of identifying common or 
complementary objectives and combined planning and responses in order to lay the foundation 
for a complementarity between the different phases and to help create a smooth transition from 
reinsertion to reintegration programming. They also highlighted how the different approaches of 
DPKO and UNDP and different operational priorities created irreconcilable divisions over the 
direction and content of the programme, despite integrated institutional arrangements. 
Experience in Sudan has been similarly fraught. Again, a narrow, security-focused and top-down 
approach was advocated by DPKO, whilst UNDP and other developmental actors promoted an 
alternative model that included a ‗community security fund‘ and the promotion of needs-based 
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disarmament. This emphasised local and participatory approaches to defining ‗community 
security needs‘, and supported different income-generation and other recovery-related support in 
exchange for voluntary disarmament.
111
 This and other challenges to the process have meant that 
little has been achieved in the two years of implementation beyond the approval of a national 
DDR policy.
112
  
 
The experiences of Haiti and Sudan suggest it is difficult to build on linkages between the 
various elements of DDR through integrated, coordinated efforts. Not only have they not 
achieved their declared goals, but arguably the attempt to develop this integration has made it 
even more difficult to meet the fundamental security objectives of the DDR programme. While 
there may be benefits to complementary approaches without agreement between the key actors 
on objectives and without integrated community-driven approaches in the initial planning phase, 
top-down efforts will continue to fail and delays will continue to plague long-term reintegration 
support. In order to respond to this important challenge effectively, institutional changes such as 
possible complementarities between agency approaches should be developed to inform logistical 
planning and practical implementation at every stage of the reinsertion-reintegration dynamic. 
For example, with the Mobile Information Counselling and Referral Service (MIRCAS) 
programme Mindanao, in the Philippines, the UNDP funded this highly visible component of 
reinsertion assistance which was, executed by the IOM. This is a good example of how agencies 
can actually coordinate their mandates and resources in designing programmes for ex-
combatants.  
5.2 Funding issues 
Viewed from a humanitarian and development assistance perspective, DDR programmes often 
attract significant financial support at a time of limited aid assistance, and in a context of high 
vulnerability. Traditionally much emphasis  in funding and in agency programming was confined 
to the more technical and tangible phases of disarmament and demobilization, but over the years 
a perceptible shift in agency focus and programming is evident with growing acknowledgement 
that the reintegration and now the reinsertion phase is critical to the sustainability of DD success 
and indeed to the overall success of DDR. Consequently nearly 85 percent of recent DDR 
funding is budgeted for the reinsertion and reintegration phases.
113
 Funding channels include 
assessed contributions in UN peacekeeping missions, Multi Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) 
managed by, for example, the World Bank or UNDP, and bilateral funding; the UN Peace-
building Commission may be added to this list in the future. UN peacekeeping missions often 
include DDR funding as an assessed contribution, with provisions for support to reinsertion 
programming.  
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Despite, the range of funding options and the seemingly large amount of financial support 
available, in reality DDR programmes face problems obtaining money in a timely way and on 
the scale required.
114
 A review of the 18 DDR programmes in operation in 2005, for example, 
showed that seven faced financial problems.
115
 Multiple funding processes mean that some 
elements are well financed, while others are not. Most funds are channelled through the World 
Bank, either by means of regional funds or through direct disbursement to specific countries. 
Such arrangements generally introduce complex power relations and networks into the DDR 
process, especially when policy is driven by one international institution, but funding is 
distributed by another. Some donors elect to fund a programme bilaterally, in addition to funding 
through a trust fund. This can often usefully be channelled to address specific, even niche, parts 
of the DDR process – arms reduction and control programmes or public awareness campaigns, 
for example – ensuring that they are always sufficiently funded. On the other hand, this form of 
funding can be overburdened with conditions and reporting requirements. This results in 
overlapping and cross – cutting mandates and often a lack of basic coordination. 
 
Financial limitations reduce opportunities for coordination and complementarity between parallel 
processes at the reinsertion phase. For instance in Liberia, both the reinsertion and reintegration 
phases of the DDR programme lacked adequate resources at a time when other transitional 
programming had yet to create sufficient employment opportunities. As a result, many ex-
combatants sought out their former faction commanders, who helped them find work on rubber 
plantations. This dependency on former leaders created the conditions for possible 
remobilisation.
116
 Lack of funding has also affected the DDR process in Sierra Leone, which has 
suffered from delays in the delivery of training, allowances and toolkits. A lack of sustainable 
employment after training has led many to turn to crime.
117
 Thus funding issues plague each 
stage of DDR and reinsertion and reintegration phases in particular face the brunt of resource 
shortfalls as evidenced in Liberia, which has made the relatively successful D & D phases 
vulnerable to the difficulties in delivering reintegration benefits over the long term, which has 
fuelled disappointment amongst the ex-combatant community and threatens sustainable recovery 
and transition in that country.
118
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Conclusion  
The focus of this working paper has been the reinsertion phase of DDR and how it could be 
effectively linked to other DDR phases. Without assuming a linear progression from one phase 
to another in the DDR process, the analysis has conceptualized the reinsertion assistance as a 
linking element between demobilization and reintegration. As it is often implemented as part of 
demobilization activities and given that the literature makes little attempt to make a distinction 
between reinsertion and reintegration projects, one of the main objectives here was to locate the 
reinsertion assistance in the overall landscape of DDR undertakings. Therefore, the discussions 
in the first section were initiated with an overview of DDR phases and what significant role the 
reinsertion assistance could play in relation to such transitional activities. It is with this objective 
in mind that the paper elaborated the differences between reinsertion and reintegration through 
the factors of timing, scope and type of activities. These issues are particularly important to 
understand the critical elements of the cash versus ‗in kind‘ debate, which is fundamental to 
position the reinsertion assistance within the DDR framework effectively.  
The investigation of financial reinsertion assistance has shown that it provides a number of 
advantages in its delivery to former combatants while waiting for their reintegration packages. 
The paper has also incorporated a critique of financial reinsertion assistance.  A number of 
critical issues, such as targeting criteria for the selection of beneficiaries, the planning and 
logistic challenges of funding mobilisation, and decisions on its amount and methods of delivery 
were considered in order to elaborate the way reinsertion assistance can be used for transitional 
programming. Furthermore, to explore other methods of reinsertion assistance provision in an 
effective way the paper also elaborated how voucher and in-kind kit assistance programmes such 
as food, domestic and agricultural tools and shelter materials can be planned and implemented. 
One of the main conceptual underpinnings of these discussions was that the relationship between 
reinsertion and reintegration is determined by the overarching objective of each DDR phase and 
the degree to which the D & D are understood within purely a security prism and essentially as a 
confidence-building exercise in a peace process, and possibly, a step towards long-term 
recovery.  
The new institutional arrangements of the IDDRS, while providing structures that allow greater 
complementarity, continues to be plagued by an in-built tension between the security-focused 
approach of DPKO and the more community-oriented perspective of UNDP. Until these tensions 
are addressed, or at the very least tackled at the planning and strategy phase of the DDR process, 
easing the transition from reinsertion to reintegration will continue to be mired in lags and gaps. 
While opportunities exist at a programmatic or operational level to ensure greater 
complementarity between reinsertion initiatives and long-term reintegration, experience shows 
that, without overall coherence, these efforts will be piecemeal at best and counter-productive at 
worst.  
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Reinsertion represents the transition between the security-oriented disarmament and 
demobilisation phases and the often more community-oriented reintegration phase of DDR, and 
is therefore more vulnerable than any other component to inconsistencies between the two. 
Delays in the commencement of the reintegration phase can mean that reinsertion packages are 
relied on, not only to meet immediate needs while ex-combatants move from military to civilian 
status, but also to support the initial phase of reintegration. The failure of reinsertion packages to 
effectively support early reintegration has been clearly demonstrated in contexts such as Liberia 
and Sierra Leone. This failure in turn has a significant impact on human security and long-term 
development, and in particular any kind of disconnect affects the poorest members of society 
most severely, whether ex-combatants or those communities associated with them. Therefore, 
this paper recommends that this phase is tightly time-bound and focuses on the demilitarisation 
rather re-civilianisation aspects of the process.  
The main recommendations presented are summarised below and they clearly have a number of 
implications for how DDR programmes are structured, coordinated, funded and implemented, 
and how they can underpin broader reintegration processes.  
 Reintegration is a complex and drawn out process, yet the way in which ex-combatants 
are introduced to reintegration programmes needs a more human sensitive and human 
security approach – ex-combatants cannot be de-programmed in a mechanistic mode to 
be civilians, rather the social bonding elements of community based reintegration can 
help heal wounds of conflict. Reinsertion packages can facilitate the initiation of this 
process, by reintroducing the basic semblance of civilian existence through its efforts on 
the well-being and economic sustainability of ex-combatants in the post discharge period. 
 
 Reinsertion support should be broken down into support for ‗movement‘ and ‗support for 
resettlement‘. The movement element should include the period of transit from an 
assembly area to a community, with support for transport and subsistence, and other basic 
needs during this time. This type of reinsertion should be focused on the individual and 
their travelling dependants.  
 
 Reinsertion support for resettlement would also need to adopt a combatant-focused 
approach to a large extent, as moving away from individual support could easily dilute 
the main objective of reinsertion assistance, and in reality this may simply be impossible 
to achieve due to funding constraints. However, it is important to retain flexibility in 
determining the level of resettlement support, and if possible, would even ensure a 
greater benefit for the community and for civilian returnees. Nevertheless, it is important 
to recognize that the main objective of reinsertion assistance should be to have a ‗stop-
gap‘ impact while demobilized combatants are waiting for their reintegration benefits.  
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 It needs to be acknowledged that a combatant-focused approach can easily create 
resentment and dissatisfaction among the civilian population and consequently, targeting 
issues and the question of beneficiaries in DDR will also be a point of debate. However, 
this paper assumes the position that community-based approaches are best for long-term 
reintegration support, and calls for a reinsertion assistance approach that prioritizes the 
return and immediate resettlement needs of ex-combatants. 
 
 The entitlement or inducement debate in DDR is probably one of the most controversial 
issues that planners and practitioners need to bear in mind, but reinsertion benefits should 
be viewed outside of this framework as a demobilized combatant returning ‗home‘ 
empty-handed could easily become a potential security risk as the period immediately 
after demobilization is particularly critical in their transformation of identity from a 
combatant to civilian. Their potential involvement in crime for example, could easily 
worsen the social reintegration prospects further in later stages of DDR. Therefore, 
although the paper advocates a human resource development perspective in the 
reintegration phase which would be expected to address the challenges with the receiving 
communities‘ absorption capacities as much as possible; for reinsertion assistance to be 
effective it needs to be targeting ex-combatants first in their transition from 
demobilization to reintegration. 
 
 Contextual analysis should be strengthened, and should be more clearly integrated into 
the delivery process, which is particularly imperative for ensuring a well-balanced 
understanding of how reinsertion benefits for ex-combatants can be perceived as rewards 
by war-affected communities.  
 
 Financial assistance provided in benefit packages is often controversial as an option, but 
experience suggests that cash as part of reinsertion assistance has an empirically 
substantiated role to play in support for ex-combatant return to their home communities. 
 
 For the success of financial reinsertion assistance it is necessary to identify specific needs 
of each target group within the broader ex-combatant caseload. This requires careful 
planning, adequate monitoring and sufficient funding to tailor the reinsertion assistance 
accordingly in terms of its selection criteria, amount and delivery.  
 
 The existence of an operational banking system and incorporation of a financial 
education component would be likely to impart the necessary financial prudence for the 
efficient delivery and utilization of financial assistance. However, this needs to be 
complemented with innovative and flexible modalities of distribution in more complex 
environments. 
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 Specific needs in the post-demobilisation transition period need to be approached with a 
balanced mix of in-kind, voucher and financial components as part of reinsertion 
packages. The reinsertion period consists of significant undertakings such as return and 
resettlement, which can be catered for by using cash, vouchers, and in-kind elements 
appropriate to each stage of reinsertion.  
 
 In the planning of reinsertion assistance it is imperative that the overall socio-economic 
dynamics and poverty challenges are factored in as key variables to minimise any 
resentment and marginalisation of broader war-affected communities. This can ensure a 
better linkage from reinsertion to reintegration, contributing to the sustainability of 
identity transformation of ex-combatants. 
 
 Coordination must allow for a more holistic understanding of the purpose and priority of 
the reinsertion support in any given context. This will require a clear awareness of the 
risk that the DDR process is open to compartmentalisation due to the involvement of 
military and civilian actors with different and even sometimes conflicting mandates.  
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